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THE VALUES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: 
A REPLY TO SEIDENFELD† 
Blake Emerson* 
I appreciate the opportunity to continue the conversation on democracy 
in the administrative state that I hoped The Public’s Law would inspire.1 In 
his review, Mark Seidenfeld critiques some of the book’s legal reform pro-
posals. He argues that I am too optimistic about the general public’s ability 
to participate in the administrative process, about administrators’ compe-
tence to reason about social values, and about courts’ capacity to police such 
reasoning. 
The aspects of my argument Seidenfeld criticizes come at the conclusion 
of the book’s broader study of the intellectual and institutional history of the 
administrative state. This history is meant to challenge the received wisdom 
about what that state is for and how it ought to operate. The Public’s Law ar-
gues that the legitimacy of the administrative state is not just a matter of 
technocratic expertise or finding a workable balance between interest 
groups. And it’s certainly not just a matter of carrying out the president’s 
will. Rather, the history of the administrative state shows how the people can 
use it to reconstruct society in the interest of freedom. I provide a short 
summary of my book’s historical findings and normative arguments before 
turning to Seidenfeld’s critique. 
I. FROM HEGEL TO THE PROGRESSIVES’ ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Conservative jurists and scholars today often argue that the administra-
tive state is unconstitutional, either because agencies wield legislative and ad-
judicatory power, are insulated from the president’s supervision, or 
otherwise threaten liberty or democratic control.2 A prominent strand of this 
critique holds that America’s constitutional order was corrupted during the 
Progressive Era by German theories of law and government, particularly 
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 1. BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE 
DEMOCRACY (2019). 
 2. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting); Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020); Gary Law-
son, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
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those of the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel.3 These scholars argue that the Pro-
gressives’ adoption of German conceptions of the state has set us on the 
“road to serfdom.”4 Only adherence to the classical liberalism of the Framers 
can vanquish the Teutonic menace. 
The Public’s Law agrees with these conservative critics that Hegelian ide-
as influenced many of the Progressives who imagined and constructed our 
modern administrative state.5 But the theory that resulted was not some to-
talitarian nightmare. It was rather a synthesis of America’s democratic-
constitutional ideals with the best aspects of German statecraft. This Pro-
gressive-Hegelian vision influenced some administrative programs during 
the New Deal and could also be seen at work in the administration of civil 
rights laws in the 1960s. This intellectual and institutional history fore-
grounds the book’s normative account of how to restructure the state in the 
present. 
Hegel argued that the purpose of the modern state was to realize human 
freedom, which the marketplace alone both furthered and undermined.6 The 
capitalist economy furthered people’s agency insofar as it enabled them to 
fulfil their needs by contracting with others. But it undermined people’s ca-
pacity to pursue their goals by creating social inequality, conflict, and aliena-
tion. The state would help to address these problems. Implementing general 
statutory mandates, civil servants would provide the basic resources and the 
regulations necessary for people to see themselves and one another as inde-
pendent, dignified, purposeful agents. To accomplish this task, civil servants 
would need not only technical training but also “direct education in ethics 
and in thought.”7 Providing the conditions for freedom would require more 
than mechanical fixes to make the exchange more efficient. It would require 
a critical analysis and transformation of social conditions that stood in the 
way of equal and reciprocal relationships. 
Many Progressives found Hegel’s theory of the state very useful in their 
critiques of laissez-faire economics and their arguments for the reform of 
American governance.8 W.E.B. Du Bois, Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey, 
Mary Follett, and Frank Johnson Goodnow all embraced different aspects of 
Hegel’s vision for a state that would promote freedom. The great difference 
between the Progressives and Hegel was that the Progressives were deeply 
committed to democracy, while Hegel was not. The Progressives therefore 
sought to reformulate the Hegelian state so that it would be consistent with 
popular sovereignty. This meant not only electoral supervision of the bu-
 
 3. E.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 441–78 (2014). 
 4. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 65–75 (Bruce Caldwell ed., definitive ed. 2007) 
(1944). 
 5. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 61–112. 
 6. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 25–33. 
 7. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 296, at 335 (Allen W. 
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (emphasis omitted). 
 8. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 61–112. 
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reaucracy through Congress and the President but also, more fundamentally, 
public participation in the administrative process. The affected public would 
have to work with administrators to fill out the content of general statutory 
norms. 
I show how this vision played out in the New Deal and the Civil Rights 
eras.9 In the New Deal era, agricultural agencies implemented Dewey’s He-
gelian theory through participatory land-use planning, cooperative purchas-
ing programs, and traditional programmatic benefits. In the 1960s, the 
implementation of the Economic Opportunity Act and Civil Rights Act also 
had Progressive-Hegelian overtones. The War on Poverty was administered 
with the “maximum feasible participation” of impoverished communities.10 
Desegregation of schools and the workplace required ethical reasoning by 
administrators, civil rights constituencies, businesses, and state and local 
governments over the meaning and social implications of nondiscrimina-
tion.11 
While there is a great deal to admire in this history, it also reveals some 
internal dilemmas that the democratic use of administrative power must 
face. Administrative intervention is often necessary because of deep ine-
qualities in society that make it impossible for individuals to attain their 
goals without the help of the state. The Progressives’ democratic model re-
quires administrators to deliberate with citizens about the kinds of support 
and regulations the citizens need. But the very same inequalities that make 
administrative action necessary create the risk that powerful groups will 
dominate the administrative process to the detriment of the marginalized.12 
Perhaps the most egregious example was the Wilson Administration's racial 
segregation the federal civil service.13 Inegalitarian administration was also a 
serious problem in agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Administration, which white, propertied farmers were 
better able to participate in and benefit from than minorities and low-
income farmers.14 
This history motivates a normative theory of how the administrative 
state should be structured. Statutory law should direct the government to 
provide the material goods and regulatory interventions that the people have 
concluded they need to become free. This might include broad authorities 
for agencies to support education, public health and welfare, environmental 
protection, and racial and gender civil rights. But the norms and standards 
established by such statutes are almost inevitably vague. What does “requi-
 
 9. Id. at 113–48. 
 10. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, § 202(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 
516 (repealed 1967). 
 11. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 131–39. 
 12. Id. at 169. 
 13. Id. at 75–76. 
 14. Id. at 116–22. 
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site to protect the public health” mean?15 What does discrimination “because 
of . . . race”16 or “on the basis of sex”17 mean? To help answer those ques-
tions, administrative agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Department of Educa-
tion need to exercise moral, and not merely technical, reasoning. Public laws 
like the Clean Air Act and Civil Rights Act implicate value judgments about 
the kind of society we want to create. Agencies therefore should not be de-
signed merely as efficient machines for carrying out statutory objectives. Ra-
ther, agencies need to provide forums for the people to work with civil 
servants to understand and debate contested political questions—not merely 
in the abstract, but in terms of the consequences of particular regulatory ap-
proaches for their lives. 
II. CAN THE PUBLIC DELIBERATE ABOUT REGULATIONS? 
Seidenfeld argues that “the general public is not well suited to deliberate 
about regulations.”18 He notes that ordinary citizens usually don’t under-
stand regulations well enough to assess them.19 It is no doubt true that ad-
ministrative policymaking often involves difficult technical, scientific, and 
economic questions that untrained citizens will have difficulty understand-
ing. Indeed, one of the central tensions The Public’s Law explores is between 
the need for the state to act efficiently to implement policy and the need to 
engage the affected, but often uninformed and disempowered, public in 
shaping such policy. The solution is not, however, to keep the general public 
at bay and let deliberations among professional elites conclude important 
policy decisions. Rather, the solution is to find feasible ways to engage the 
people without crippling the regulatory process. 
The book recovers several historical examples of how this might be 
done. One of the earliest comes from the Forest Service, which in 1923 circu-
lated draft regulations concerning grazing on public lands to stockmen.20 As 
reported in a long-ignored study by John Preston Comer, the Service’s pur-
poses in this process were “setting the live-stock associations to thinking, 
and provoking criticism on the part of the various forest district officials.”21 
During a week-long conference, Forest Service officials met with interested 
parties in ten subcommittees and also in an open “free-for-all” hearing in 
 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 16. Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
 17. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 18. Mark Seidenfeld, The Limits of Deliberation About the Public’s Values, 119 MICH. L. 
REV. n, n+12 (2021) (cleaned up). 
 19. Id. at 13. 
 20. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 94 & 230 n.204. 
 21. JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITIES 209 (1927). 
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which “[q]uestions of principle and policy were discussed freely.”22 Most of 
the suggestions generated by these hearings were adopted, but disagreement 
over whether stockmen held a property interest in grazing rights on public 
lands resulted in further debates in Congress.23 This early example shows 
that extensive public deliberation is feasible, can inform final policy judg-
ments, and can motivate continued political contestation about the position 
an agency takes. Such public participation provides additional contexts, be-
yond elections, in which people can intervene in and learn about policy and 
thus become more active and educated citizens. 
The agricultural New Deal extended this model further.24 The Depart-
ment of Agriculture organized hundreds of thousands of representative 
farmers into local committees with government officials and civil servants to 
develop and implement reforms in land use, health care, and education.25 
The purpose of such efforts was not only to get input from farmers on agri-
cultural reforms but simultaneously to educate them about modern farming 
techniques. The War on Poverty in the 1960s likewise engaged residents in 
impoverished communities in designing and implementing antipoverty ini-
tiatives, including the ongoing early childhood education program Head 
Start, and helped to support emerging urban Black political leadership.26 
Such examples probably won’t come up in your typical administrative 
law course, even though they involve the work of federal administrative 
agencies. We focus too much on questions of judicial review and on a fairly 
narrow set of agencies that often come before the D.C. Circuit and Supreme 
Court. We would do better to broaden our horizons and teach students and 
policymakers the wide variety of institutional forms and purposes the ad-
ministrative state can pursue. 
There are interesting contemporary examples and reform proposals 
along the lines of the Progressive theory, some of which the book briefly dis-
cussed.27 These address Seidenfeld’s concern that people simply aren’t 
equipped to deliberate about complex regulations. The trick is to find proce-
dures that help the people understand what the experts are doing while in-
forming the experts of the people’s concerns. In a report prepared for the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), Cheryl Blake and I 
studied how agencies can write regulations and other public-facing docu-
ments in “plain language” so that ordinary citizens can participate in making 
 
 22. Id. at 209–10. 
 23. Id. at 211. 
 24. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 118–22. 
 25. Id. at 121. This part of The Public’s Law relies on the excellent work of Jess Gilbert. 
JESS GILBERT, PLANNING DEMOCRACY: AGRARIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE INTENDED NEW 
DEAL (2015). On the election of bureaucrats in agricultural programs, see Joshua Ulan 
Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213 (2020). 
 26. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 142–44. On the War on Poverty and Black political em-
powerment, see J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN URBAN 
POLITICS: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 7, 309 (1973). 
 27. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 175–76. 
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policy and understand the requirements imposed or benefits conferred.28 We 
found exemplary processes at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
which developed simplified documents to guide specific discussions with 
small businesses and consumers on various aspects of proposed regulations, 
above and beyond the basic notice-and-comment process.29 Cynthia Farina 
and her colleagues have also experimented with an e-rulemaking forum that 
helps commenters understand and provide meaningful feedback on regula-
tions.30 Michael Sant’Ambrogio and Glen Staszewski have documented and 
proposed improvements to public participation in the formulation of pro-
posed regulations.31 Based on their research for ACUS, they argue that agen-
cies should reach out to “absent stakeholders,” such as “citizens with situated 
knowledge” about the problem at hand, as well as “ordinary citizens” who 
are “most likely to convey broad support for or opposition to a rulemaking 
initiative or recommend strengthening or relaxing a regulatory standard 
based on value-laden, pre-political policy preferences or priorities.”32 
These sorts of procedures will be essential in addressing major social 
problems such as climate change. In the book, I gave the example of the 
Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan to show how agencies could im-
plement environmental policy in a highly inclusive and deliberative fashion 
that goes far beyond the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.33 
Seidenfeld thinks that subsequent events have proven me wrong because 
“the agency appears to have been unable to convince coal miners” about the 
merits of the Plan and the Trump Administration withdrew it.34 The issue, 
however, is not whether the Clean Power Plan convinced coal miners. It is 
whether the Plan’s robust participation provisions would give coal miners’ 
voices and interests, and those of other affected groups, weight in the im-
plementation of the Plan at the state and regional level.35 This scheme was 
never given a fair chance because of the change in presidential administra-
tion. The Public’s Law critiques intense presidential control of administra-
tion because it may stifle deliberative policy implementation in precisely this 
way.36 But I readily admit that Progressive administration is no panacea. It 
 
 28. BLAKE EMERSON & CHERYL BLAKE, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., PLAIN LANGUAGE IN 
REGULATORY DRAFTING (2017), https://www.acus.gov/report/plain-language-regulatory-
drafting-final-report [https://perma.cc/3EFC-CWEU]. 
 29. Id. at 10–12. 
 30. Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley & Cornell eRule-
making Initiative (CeRI), Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011). 
 31. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 
WASH. U. L. REV. 793 (2021). 
 32. Id. at 836–37. 
 33. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 201–03. 
 34. Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 14. 
 35. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 202. 
 36. Id. at 181–84, 193–203. 
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cannot substitute for ordinary electoral politics or the democratic-
constitutional rights that enable free and fair elections. 
The broader point is that addressing world-historical challenges like 
climate change will require significant social transformations and disloca-
tions. These kinds of profound, disruptive interventions can be legitimated if 
the affected public is brought into the administrative decisionmaking pro-
cess. As Kate Aronoff and her coauthors argue in their proposal for a Green 
New Deal, public participation in implementing structural changes like a 
clean-energy grid will be necessary to increase local buy-in and to ensure 
that marginalized communities have an equal share in the benefits of a green 
economy.37 Public participation on its own will not be enough, however. If 
we do not address the inequalities in access and influence that pervade ad-
ministrative policymaking, regulatory outcomes will favor the already pow-
erful.38 It is not enough to open the doors of the state. We have to make sure 
there are direct bus routes and smooth ramps to the entryway. 
III. CAN ADMINISTRATORS ENGAGE IN MORAL REASONING? 
Seidenfeld argues that “agency staff are not appropriate for the role Em-
erson asks them to fill,” which is to engage in moral deliberation with the af-
fected public in implementing the law.39 He notes that agency staff are 
“chemists, biologists, health scientists, engineers, accountants, and other in-
dividuals who are trained in particular disciplines” and “generally have no 
special skill in encouraging deliberation or in evaluating inputs from the 
public to divine some overarching public value to guide regulation.”40 The 
examples The Public’s Law recovers from the New Deal, in which agricultur-
al specialists worked with citizens on land-use planning, suggest that scien-
tific experts can indeed deliberate with the affected public.41 But I take the 
point that scientists and economists have no special training as facilitators of 
public deliberation. 
It is surprising, however, that Seidenfeld’s list of officials omits another 
crucial professional category within administrative agencies: lawyers. Com-
petent attorneys know how to explain complex legal problems to their clients 
in ways they can understand and to translate their clients’ needs and inter-
 
 37. See KATE ARONOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & THEA 
RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL 25, 111 (2019). 
 38. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 172–73. 
 39. Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 20 (cleaned up). Seidenfeld says that “Emerson sees the 
bureaucracy playing a role of facilitating deliberation by the general public, rather than engag-
ing in deliberation itself.” Id. That’s not quite right. I envision deliberation between members 
of the public and the civil service. See EMERSON, supra note 1, at 184 (“In consultation 
with . . . affected parties, administrative officials would exercise their interpretive discretion to 
dismantle social relationships characterized by servitude, domination, and exclusion, and sup-
port in their place equal, integrated, and reciprocal relationships between citizens.”). 
 40. Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 20–21. 
 41. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 118–26. 
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ests into legal claims. Lawyers can use the same skills to deliberate with af-
fected parties about the normative and practical consequences of various 
regulatory proposals and actions. I try to prepare students for these kinds of 
tasks in law school. In administrative law and torts, I teach students to think 
about the often-conflicting values that underlie legal rules—values like indi-
vidual liberty, economic efficiency, and social equality. Many of my col-
leagues surely do the same. The regulatory impact analysis imposed by the 
White House’s Office of Management and Budget also permits agencies to 
consider such values.42 Agency lawyers thus should have the professional 
training, and often the formal authority, to reason with the affected public 
about the value judgments that are implicated in the agencies’ policies. 
The Public’s Law provides several examples of civil servants engaged in 
this kind of moral reasoning in the New Deal and the Civil Rights eras. Con-
sider, for example, how the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s 
Office for Civil Rights explained the inadequacy of a “free choice” system for 
dismantling segregated education in the South: 
A free choice plan tends to place the burden of desegregation on the Negro 
or other minority group students and their parents. . . . [T]he very nature of 
a free choice plan and the effect of long-standing community attitudes of-
ten tend to preclude or inhibit the exercise of a truly free choice by or for 
minority group students.43 
Attorneys in the Office for Civil Rights understood that there would be 
very little freedom for black students in the South if they were left only with 
a choice among schools to attend. The Office thus instituted numerical quo-
tas which helped make major progress in desegregating the South over the 
next decade.44 
While value judgments like these may be most obvious in the admin-
istration of civil rights law, they also arise in many other, more technical 
regulatory arenas. In environmental law, Douglas Kysar has offered a philo-
sophically grounded critique of the use of cost-benefit analysis to assess vari-
ous environmental regulations.45 He argues that this now-standard 
technique “invites exclusionary, technocratic decision making in the face of 
grave, uncertain collective choices, precisely the context that . . . instead re-
quires inclusiveness, transparency, and candid acknowledgment that ethical 
choices are being undertaken.”46 Purportedly neutral, scientific decisions 
about how much to invest in levee construction around New Orleans, for in-
stance, cloaked value choices about the worth of human life and governmen-
 
 42. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012); Memorandum on Moderniz-
ing Regulatory Review, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–2 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
 43. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 132–33 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 181.54(a) (1967)). 
 44. Id. at 133. 
 45. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010). 
 46. Id. at 92. 
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tal responsibility to protect citizens.47 Particularly when we are dealing with 
great empirical uncertainty about the likelihood of disastrous events or toxic 
harms, even high-quality scientific or economic analysis cannot eliminate 
the necessity of moral reasoning about how much and what sort of precau-
tions we ought to take. Likewise, the appropriate distribution of benefits and 
burdens from regulatory action (or inaction) cannot be answered through 
efficiency analysis alone. We must instead ask and answer the difficult ques-
tion of what distribution is just. 
Given that moral reasoning is required to answer these sorts of adminis-
trative questions, we need to ask more of public officials than technical pro-
ficiency. We need them to have what Hegel called an “ethical” education—an 
ability to communicate clearly with ordinary citizens, a familiarity with the 
normative values that our society holds dear, and a capacity to translate soci-
ety’s values and citizen’s interests into concrete legal rules.48 Law schools 
can—and, at their best, do—provide such education. 
IV. CAN THE COURTS POLICE AGENCIES’ VALUE JUDGMENTS? 
Seidenfeld argues that I am overly optimistic about courts’ ability to re-
view and constrain agencies’ value judgments.49 My approach would not, as 
he suggests, have courts “decide whether the values of the public coincide 
with those the agency credited.”50 That would indeed be far beyond the judi-
ciary’s institutional competence. Rather, the question on review should be 
whether the agency has reasonably explained its value choices and responded 
to pertinent public comments concerning the values implicated in its deci-
sion. 
Judicial review at present is unduly focused on the technical aspects of 
agency decisionmaking. Review focuses on whether there is “rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made.”51 The problem with 
this approach is that it often distorts agencies’ explanation of their policies. If 
agencies know they will only survive review if they offer an apparently value-
neutral, scientific explanation of their regulations, they will conceal the nor-
mative commitments that also underlie their policy choices. This is bad for 
democratic legitimacy because the people won’t understand why the gov-
ernment does what it does, and they will get an inaccurate picture of the 
questions government bureaucracies face. The Public’s Law proposes instead 
that courts should “require agencies to state with greater clarity the various 
values that are at issue in their interpretation and application of statutory 
 
 47. Id. at 90. 
 48. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 32. 
 49. Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 21. 
 50. Id. at 26. 
 51. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). 
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terms, to rank those values where possible, and to explain how those values 
contribute to the regulatory decisions and plans they have developed.”52 
Seidenfeld disagrees with this proposal because he thinks that 
“[v]alues . . . are often impossible to argue in a logical sense,” and so courts 
won’t really be able to hold agencies’ value-based arguments up to scrutiny.53 
Instead, he endorses a more traditional form of arbitrary-and-capricious re-
view in which agencies must identify “regulatory trade-offs” and courts 
should “review technical arguments” made by agencies.54 
While I am indeed more skeptical than Seidenfeld is about generalist 
courts’ capacity to evaluate the scientific or economic foundations of gov-
ernment policy, our positions are not so different as he thinks. Consider the 
example he gives of Rust v. Sullivan.55 In that case, the Supreme Court up-
held a regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
that prohibited recipients of federal funds from providing abortion counsel-
ing and engaging in other abortion-related activities. The Court found that 
the regulation was reasonable in part because it accepted the agency’s argu-
ment that the policy was “supported by a shift in attitude against the ‘elimi-
nation of unborn children . . . .’ ”56 Seidenfeld justly criticizes the Court for 
failing to consider the fact that the agency had not responded to a counter-
vailing concern raised by commenters, namely, that the proposed regulation 
would put women’s health at risk.57 I am in complete agreement with Sei-
denfeld’s position on this point. Given the Court’s prior conclusion that it 
was constitutional for publicly funded health programs to disfavor abor-
tion,58 and given the relevant statutory framework,59 it was permissible for 
HHS to consider the fact that some members of the democratic public have a 
moral opposition to abortion in crafting family planning policies. But the 
agency nonetheless had an obligation to balance this position against the 
value of pregnant women's health, which commenters had drawn attention 
to.60 Because it failed to engage with a value pertinent to the statutory 
 
 52. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 180. 
 53. Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 22. 
 54. Id. at 24, 26. 
 55. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 56. Rust, 500 U.S. at 187 (quoting Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds 
in Programs Where Abortion Is a Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2944 (Feb. 2, 
1988)). 
 57. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 110–11 (1994). 
 58. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (prohibiting use of Title X funds in “programs where abortion is 
a method of family planning”). 
 60. See Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abor-
tion Is a Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. at 2936, 2938; Seidenfeld, supra note 57, at 
110. 
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scheme,61 the agency’s one-sided concern with reducing the incidence of 
abortion should have been found arbitrary and therefore unlawful. 
The case presents a particularly troubling example of an agency failing 
to adequately account for the normative values implicated by its decision. 
On the approach to judicial review I have advocated, courts would require 
agencies to engage explicitly with the conflicting values within the relevant 
statute’s zone of interest and to solicit and respond to public comments on 
the proper interpretation, application, and relative importance of those val-
ues. This approach is not totally foreign to administrative law as it is today.62 
But the dominance of economistic analysis has often withered agencies’ and 
courts’ capacity to reason about values in a way that recognizes a plurality of 
human aims and interests.63 
Expertise should certainly remain a component of agencies’ reasoning, 
as officials will have to put forth some plausible account of the concrete ben-
efits and burdens their action is likely to have on the values at issue. But that 
secondary question cannot even be reached if we aren’t first crystal clear on 
what moral values are in play. Traditional administrative law has difficulty 
addressing that more fundamental issue. That is why I propose to shift the 
balance from ever-increasing reliance on often-dubious methods of cost-
benefit analysis to a more candid explanation of the value judgments that 
move the agency to act.64 This way, reviewing courts and the public will 
know what values are at issue, and the agency will be required to contem-
plate social interests other than those prioritized by the incumbent admin-
istration. Although agencies won't have to provide a complete philosophical 
justification of their decisions, they will be required to offer reasonable re-
sponses to value-based arguments made by commenters and explain how 
they have ranked or weighted the relevant concerns. Members of the public 
can then hold the administration accountable for its choices about which 
values to prioritize. 
Let me give another example from a famous administrative law case. In 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,65 the Court rejected the Food 
and Drug Administration’s attempt to regulate tobacco products. Part of the 
Court’s reasoning was that the decision to regulate tobacco was one of “eco-
nomic and political significance” that the legislature was unlikely to have 
 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. § 300 (authorizing grants for “family planning methods and services”). 
 62. See, e.g., Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(“[I]f the judicial review which Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaning-
ful, the [agencies’ regulatory preamble] will enable us to see what major issues of policy were 
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.”). 
 63. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 187–93. On this issue, see the pathbreaking work of 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) and, more recently, WENDY 
BROWN, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37 (2005). 
 64. For trenchant criticism of cost-benefit analysis, see, for example, Thomas O. 
McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002). 
 65. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
92 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:81 
delegated to the agency.66 As I’ve argued elsewhere, this is the wrong ap-
proach to cases involving such “major questions.”67 In order to promote the 
democratic state the Progressives envisioned, courts should instead only de-
fer to an agency’s resolution of a major question if the agency engages in a 
deliberative process that reasonably addresses the relevant values at issue. In 
the case of the tobacco regulation, FDA appears to have done just that. In re-
sponse to comments arguing that the regulations would undermine “free 
choice for adults,” for instance, FDA’s regulatory preamble stated: 
FDA believes that adults should continue to have the freedom to choose 
whether or not they will use tobacco products. However, because nicotine 
is addictive, the choice of continuing to smoke, or use smokeless tobacco, 
may not be truly voluntary. Because abundant evidence shows 
that . . . children are not equipped to make a mature choice about using to-
bacco products, the agency believes children under age 18 must be protect-
ed from this addictive substance.68 
It’s this blend of value-based but also consequentialist reasoning that 
agencies should practice and courts should not only respect but encourage. 
Traditional hard look review can be quite valuable in requiring agencies to 
act on the basis of science, as has arguably been demonstrated by the Trump 
Administration’s very poor track record in administrative law cases.69 But it 
would be a mistake to press agencies into explaining policies on major issues 
like climate change or sexual harassment by relying only on an apparently 
value-neutral assessment of costs and benefits or technological feasibility. 
We need agencies to conduct sound moral as well as economic and scientific 
reasoning, and to do so in a way that the public can engage with and under-
stand. 
That’s a tall order. It won’t be fully achieved with minor doctrinal ad-
justments to standards of judicial review. It will require statutory changes 
that simultaneously extend the transformative reach of the regulatory state, 
deepen public participation requirements, and give agencies the significant 
fiscal and staffing resources necessary to implement the law responsively. 
But such democratic burdens are justified by the harms they avoid: social 
domination and arbitrary rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
I would like to conclude by thanking Seidenfeld for providing such 
thought-provoking criticism of The Public’s Law. His research has opened 
administrative-law scholarship to the questions about political legitimacy my 
book tackles. It will be an important task for future work to fill out the insti-
tutional design The Public’s Law outlines. 
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